XXE via XInclude
An XInclude attack is the way to achieve XXE-style file reads when you only control part of an XML document and cannot add a DOCTYPE: you inject an `xi:include` element referencing a local file, and a parser with XInclude processing enabled substitutes the file's contents into the document.
- Target formats
- Plain XMLSOAPServer-built XML
- Affected parsers
- Java (XIncludeAware)libxml via XIncludePython lxml (xinclude)
- Impact
- Local file disclosureSSRF
How it works
Many applications take client data and embed it inside a larger XML document they build server-side, then parse the whole thing. You cannot add a DOCTYPE because you do not control the top of the document — but you can inject elements into the part you supply.
XInclude is a W3C spec that lets one XML document pull in another. By injecting an xi:include element with the XInclude namespace and an href pointing at a file, you get the same file-read primitive without ever declaring an entity.
Which parser configuration makes it work
Requires XInclude processing to be enabled on the parser (for example a Java factory with setXIncludeAware(true), or lxml with xinclude() called). It does not need DOCTYPE control, which is what makes it useful against embedded-XML endpoints.
Representative payloads
Replace callback hosts and target paths with your own authorized test values.
<foo xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude">
<xi:include parse="text" href="file:///etc/passwd"/>
</foo>parse="text" returns raw bytes and tolerates files that are not well-formed XML.
<foo xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude">
<xi:include href="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"/>
</foo>Detection
As a tester, inject an xi:include into any field that ends up inside server-built XML and check for the file contents. As a defender, look for the XInclude namespace (http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude) or xi:include elements in data that originates from clients, and check whether your parser has XInclude enabled at all — it usually should not be.
- xi:include elements or the XInclude namespace in client data
- File contents surfacing in responses from endpoints that embed user XML
- Parser configured with XIncludeAware(true) processing untrusted input
Remediation
Disable XInclude processing on the parser (setXIncludeAware(false) in Java; do not call .xinclude() in lxml) — it is off by default in most stacks and should stay off for untrusted input. Because XInclude bypasses the DOCTYPE, disabling only DOCTYPE is not sufficient here: you must also null the resolver / disable external resource loading so xi:include cannot fetch file:// or http:// targets. Encode or reject client data before embedding it into server-built XML.
Fix checklist
- Disable XInclude awareness on the parser (primary fix)
- Null the resolver / disable external resource loading
- Do not embed raw client data into server-side XML — encode or validate first
- Remember DOCTYPE-only hardening does not stop XInclude