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How to prevent XXE: parser hardening by language

The single most effective XXE fix is to disable DOCTYPE and external entity resolution in your XML parser. These guides give the exact, copy-pasteable configuration for the common parsers in each ecosystem, plus the mistakes that quietly re-introduce the vulnerability.

disable external entities in .NET

To disable external entities in .NET and prevent XXE, rely on the safe defaults of modern XmlReader (DtdProcessing.Prohibit) and set XmlResolver to null on XmlDocument; the main risk is legacy code using XmlTextReader or explicitly re-enabling DTD processing.

Go encoding/xml XXE

Go encoding/xml XXE attacks do not work against the standard library: encoding/xml tokenises directives but never resolves external entities or loads DTDs, so file-read and SSRF via XXE are not possible — the caveats are third-party cgo bindings to libxml and basic entity-expansion limits.

disable external entities in Java

To disable external entities in Java and prevent XXE, configure each XML factory before you parse: the single strongest setting is the Xerces feature disallow-doctype-decl, which rejects any document containing a DOCTYPE and so eliminates both file-read and billion-laughs attacks in one line.

Node.js XXE prevention

Node.js XXE prevention is mostly about parser choice: the popular pure-JavaScript parsers (fast-xml-parser, xml2js) do not process DTDs or external entities at all, so they are safe by default — the real exposure is libxmljs, a binding to libxml2, when it is told to load DTDs or substitute entities.

prevent XXE in PHP

To prevent XXE in PHP you mostly need to avoid re-enabling a danger that is off by default: since libxml 2.9.0, external entity substitution is disabled, so DOMDocument and SimpleXML are safe unless you explicitly pass LIBXML_NOENT or LIBXML_DTDLOAD when loading untrusted XML.

prevent XXE in Python

To prevent XXE in Python, use the defusedxml package in place of the standard-library XML modules — it rejects DTDs and entities outright — and when you need lxml, build an XMLParser with resolve_entities=False, no_network=True and load_dtd=False before parsing untrusted input.

prevent XXE in Ruby

To prevent XXE in Ruby, lean on Nokogiri's safe defaults: it parses without substituting external entities and without network access unless you explicitly add the NOENT, DTDLOAD or NONET-clearing options — so the rule is simply not to enable them on untrusted XML.