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XXE with PHP stream wrappers

PHP XXE php://filter attacks extend classic file reads on PHP targets: the php://filter wrapper base64-encodes a file before the entity returns it, so source code and files containing XML metacharacters survive, while the expect:// wrapper (when installed) can turn XXE into command execution.

Target formats
Plain XMLSOAP
Affected parsers
PHP libxml (DOMDocument/SimpleXML with unsafe flags)
Impact
Source code disclosureConfig/secret theftRCE (expect://)

How it works

A plain file:// read breaks whenever the file contains <, & or other XML-significant bytes — the parser chokes before returning the data. On PHP, the php://filter stream wrapper solves this: php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=... returns the file as base64, which is XML-safe, and you decode it afterwards.

If the (non-default) expect extension is loaded, the expect:// wrapper runs a shell command, escalating XXE to remote code execution.

Which parser configuration makes it work

Requires a PHP application parsing untrusted XML with external entities enabled (e.g. libxml < 2.9, or LIBXML_NOENT/LIBXML_DTDLOAD passed explicitly). expect:// additionally requires the PECL expect extension to be installed.

Representative payloads

Replace callback hosts and target paths with your own authorized test values.

Base64-encode a PHP source file
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/var/www/html/config.php">
]>
<foo>&xxe;</foo>

Decode the returned base64 to recover the raw source, metacharacters and all.

Command execution via expect:// (if installed)
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "expect://id">
]>
<foo>&xxe;</foo>

Detection

As a tester, use php://filter whenever a raw read returns nothing or malformed output. As a defender, inspect XML bodies for php://, expect:// and data:// schemes in SYSTEM identifiers, and confirm whether the application ever passes LIBXML_NOENT or LIBXML_DTDLOAD to its loader — those flags re-enable the entity resolution that modern libxml disables by default.

  • SYSTEM entities using php://, expect:// or data:// schemes
  • Code paths calling loadXML/simplexml with LIBXML_NOENT or LIBXML_DTDLOAD
  • Base64 blobs in responses that decode to local source files

Remediation

Never pass LIBXML_NOENT or LIBXML_DTDLOAD when loading untrusted XML — modern libxml (2.9+) disables external entity substitution by default, and these flags are what switch it back on. On PHP versions before 8.0 you can additionally call libxml_disable_entity_loader(true) as defence in depth (it is deprecated and unnecessary on 8.0+). Do not install the expect extension on servers that parse untrusted XML, and validate input against a schema rather than trusting entity output.

Fix checklist

  • Do not pass LIBXML_NOENT / LIBXML_DTDLOAD to loadXML / simplexml_load_string
  • On PHP < 8, call libxml_disable_entity_loader(true) as defence in depth
  • Keep the expect PECL extension off XML-processing servers
  • Validate parsed data against an allow-list schema

Parser-specific configuration: PHP.

Related techniques

References