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mediumOut-of-band

XXE by switching JSON endpoints to XML

The JSON to XML XXE content-type attack exploits APIs that advertise JSON but will also accept XML: by changing the Content-Type header to application/xml and resubmitting the body as XML, you can reach an underlying XML parser that the JSON interface hid, and trigger external entity injection against it.

Target formats
REST APIsPlain XML
Affected parsers
Java frameworks (Jackson XML, JAXB).NET model bindersSpring content negotiation
Impact
Local file disclosureSSRFBlind exfiltration

How it works

Many frameworks support content negotiation: the same endpoint deserialises JSON or XML depending on the request's Content-Type. Developers test and secure the JSON path, unaware that the XML path is wired up too.

By taking a working JSON request, setting Content-Type: application/xml and rewriting the body as an equivalent XML document with a malicious DOCTYPE, you reach the XML deserialiser — which may resolve external entities even though the JSON front door never exposed one.

Which parser configuration makes it work

Requires a framework that will deserialise XML on the same route (content negotiation or a permissive model binder) using a parser that allows DOCTYPE/external entities. The JSON-only appearance is the lure, not a protection.

Representative payloads

Replace callback hosts and target paths with your own authorized test values.

Re-send a JSON request as XML
POST /api/user HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/xml

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<user><name>&xxe;</name></user>

Mirror the JSON structure as XML elements the deserialiser expects.

Detection

As a tester, flip the Content-Type on JSON endpoints to application/xml and probe for XXE. As a defender, enumerate which content types each route actually accepts, and alert on XML bodies arriving at endpoints that are documented as JSON-only — that mismatch is the signature of this attack.

  • application/xml bodies on routes documented as JSON
  • DOCTYPE/ENTITY declarations in API request bodies
  • XML deserialiser invoked by content negotiation on untrusted input

Remediation

Restrict each endpoint to the content types it actually needs — if a route is JSON-only, reject application/xml and other XML media types outright. Where XML must be accepted, configure the XML deserialiser (Jackson XML, JAXB, the framework's model binder) with a hardened parser that disables DOCTYPE/DTD processing and external entities. Do not assume a JSON API is safe from XXE simply because its documented interface is JSON.

Fix checklist

  • Restrict routes to the content types they require; reject unexpected XML
  • Harden the XML deserialiser (disable DOCTYPE/external entities) where XML is allowed
  • Audit framework content-negotiation defaults
  • Do not treat a JSON-facing API as automatically XXE-safe

Parser-specific configuration: Java, .NET, Node.js.

Related techniques

References